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Non-technical Summary
In recent years, a number of European countries have relied on elements of an
allowance for corporate equity (ACE) in the design of their tax systems. Making
use of an allowance for corporate equity, firms may deduct an imputed rate of
return – the so-called protective interest rate – on their equity for the determi-
nation of taxable income. Furthermore, a pure ACE-based tax system would be
designed as a personal consumption tax. Income from interest payments at
arm's-length-conditions would therefore be exempt from personal income taxa-
tion.
The effective tax burden thus varies with the rate of return of an investment.
This variation has an effect on the firms' cost of capital, i.e. the pre-tax rate of
return at which an investor is indifferent between investing and not investing.
Besides this minimum rate of return and the effective marginal tax rate
(EMTR), which can be derived thereon, the prominent role of effective average
tax rates (EATR) is more and more recognised in economics and business man-
agement. EATRs denote the effective tax burden on inframarginal investments,
i.e. investments that earn more than the minimum rate of return.
This paper investigates the basic effects of corporate tax systems which rely on
an allowance for corporate equity on rates of return, EMTRs, and EATRs. By
relying on a simple model, we show how neutrality with respect to investment
decisions – which exists under some strict assumptions – is lost in case the pro-
tective interest rate deviates from the market interest rate.
Also, we show how the relevance of the allowance for corporate equity de-
creases with an increasing rate of return. We conclude that a country might
weaken its position in tax competition for very profitable investments by
switching towards an ACE-tax, supposed the country cannot adjust headline tax
rates to be in accordance with those of competing countries which have a
broader tax base. These findings might theoretically explain why some coun-
tries have recently turned away from the ACE-concept.
Besides, by relying on our model we can gain interesting insights into the reve-
nue effects of an ACE-based tax system. We find that some robust revenues
seem to be generated by combinations of low protective interest rates and me-
dium statutory tax rates, which, however, should not exceed the statutory tax
rates of competing locations.
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Abstract
In recent years, some European countries have relied on elements of an allow-
ance for corporate equity (ACE) in the design of their tax systems. We analyse
the effects of ACE-based taxation on rates of return and effective tax rates. In-
vestment neutrality is lost if the imputed interest rate deviates from the market
interest rate. With increasing profitability, the relative importance of the ACE
compared with the statutory tax rate decreases. This might induce disadvantages
for countries that compete for profitable, multinational companies. Revenue ef-
fects indicate that tax rates under an ACE-based tax system should not exceed
those in competing countries by much.
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11. Introduction
In recent years, a number of European countries have relied on elements of an
allowance for corporate equity (ACE) in the design of their tax systems. Making
use of an allowance for corporate equity, firms may deduct an imputed rate of
return – the so-called protective interest rate – on their equity for the determi-
nation of taxable income. Furthermore, a pure ACE-based tax system would be
designed as a personal consumption tax. Income from interest payments at
arm's-length-conditions would therefore be exempt from personal income taxa-
tion.
The effective tax burden thus varies with the rate of return of an investment.
This variation has an effect on the firms' cost of capital, i.e. the pre-tax rate of
return at which an investor is indifferent between investing and not investing.
Besides this minimum rate of return and the effective marginal tax rate
(EMTR), which can be derived thereon, the prominent role of effective average
tax rates (EATR) is more and more recognised in economics and business man-
agement. EATRs denote the effective tax burden on inframarginal investments,
i.e. investments that earn more than the minimum rate of return.
This paper investigates the basic effects of corporate tax systems which rely on
an allowance for corporate equity on rates of return, EMTRs, and EATRs. By
relying on a simple model, we show how neutrality with respect to investment
decisions – which exists under some strict assumptions – is lost in case the pro-
tective interest rate deviates from the market interest rate.
Also, we show how the relevance of the allowance for corporate equity de-
creases with an increasing rate of return. We conclude that a country might
weaken its position in tax competition for very profitable investments by
switching towards an ACE-tax, supposed the country cannot adjust headline tax
rates to be in accordance with those of competing countries which have a
broader tax base. These findings might theoretically explain why some coun-
tries have recently turned away from the ACE-concept.
Besides, by relying on our model we can gain interesting insights into the reve-
nue effects of an ACE-based tax system. We find that some robust revenues
seem to be generated by combinations of low protective interest rates and me-
dium statutory tax rates, which, however, should not exceed the statutory tax
rates of competing locations.
2The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we investigate the effects
of taxation on profitability. Section 3 is dedicated to the effects on tax revenue.
Section 4 briefly concludes.
2. Effects of ACE-Based Taxation on Profitability
2.1 Starting Point and Assumptions
2.1.1 The Concepts of Neutrality and Effective Tax Burdens
2.1.1.1 Investment-Neutral Tax Systems
The starting point for considering the impact of taxation on investment activity
is investment neutrality. A tax system is neutral with respect to investment deci-
sions if the ranking of net present values of different investment projects is not
affected by taxation and the tax system does not alter the ranking with respect to
the alternative use of funds:
BA NPVNPV    Bt
A
t NPVNPV  for all investment projects A, B, (1)
NPV = 0  NPVt = 0 for all investment projects, (2)
with NPV and NPVt denoting the pre-tax and post-tax net present values, re-
spectively.
Besides the taxation of true economic profits,1 a cash flow tax with an exemp-
tion of interest income satisfies these conditions. The discount rate , which
provides a benchmark rate of return for an investor, is untouched, and net pres-
ent values are reduced proportionately.2
Under an ACE-tax, an imputed rate of return, usually set by the government, is
deductible for determining the taxable income of a corporation.3 If we assume
perfect capital markets and choose the protective interest rate appropriately, the
ACE-tax is a net present value-equivalent intertemporal transformation of the
cash flow tax.4 Things change, however, if the protective interest rate is fixed at
a higher or at a lower level than the market interest rate.
                                                                                             
1 See for example the seminal work by Samuelson (1964) and Johansson (1969).
2 See the seminal work by Brown (1948).
3 For the ACE-tax, see the seminal work by Wenger (1983) and Boadway/ Bruce (1984); see also IFS
Capital Taxes Group (1991).
4 See for example the numerical illustration by Hiller (1999), p. 204.
3In recent years, a number of European countries have gained experience with
elements of the ACE-tax: Between 1994 and 2000,5 the concept has been con-
sequently implemented upon recommendation of a group of German academics6
in Croatia. Other European countries like Italy, Austria, Sweden, Norway and
Finland have relied or still rely on elements of an ACE-based company tax.
There, for some companies the part of the profits that does not exceed an im-
puted rate of return on the whole equity or a part of the equity is taxed at a
lower rate than the part that exceeds this imputed rate of return.7
2.1.1.2 Effective Marginal Tax Burdens
In the past, instruments that measure effective marginal tax burdens have often
been applied to evaluate a tax system's neutrality properties.8 Marginal invest-
ment projects only earn the post-tax minimum rate of return required by an in-
vestor. Therefore, their net present value is zero by definition, and they are re-
markably suited to check whether condition (2) holds. It holds in case the cost
of capital p~  is equal to the market interest rate r.
To calculate the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) t~ , the tax wedge w~ , i.e.
the difference between the cost of capital and the post-tax rate of return of a
marginal investment, is divided by the cost of capital:
t~  = p
w
~
~
 = p
sp
~
~~

, (3)
where s~  denotes the post-tax rate of return for the investor.
The benchmark value which indicates neutrality depends on the type of tax
system that is analysed. For a comprehensive income tax, which includes the
                                                                                             
5 For the repeal see Knoll (2001), pp. 340-341.
6 See Wagner/ Wenger (1996); Rose (1998).
7 See Kiesewetter (1997). For Austria, see in detail Bruckner/ Gassner/ Riener-Micheler (2000), pp.
271-279; for Italy, see Bordignon/ Giannini/ Panteghini (2000). Since mid-2001, no allowance for
corporate equity has been granted for new investments any more; a recent draft tax legislation aims at
implementing a comprehensive tax reform and establishing the abolition of the dual income tax, see
Lobis (2002), p. 2. For Sweden, Norway and Finland, see for example Sørensen (1998). A protective
interest rate is only applied for the purpose of separating deemed capital income from deemed labour
income in case of sole traders and closely held companies.
8 See King/ Fullerton (1984), and – building on this work – OECD (1991), European Commission
(1992) and (2001); Caron & Stevens/ Baker & McKenzie (1999); Baker & McKenzie (2001). The
impact of an ACE-based tax on investment decisions was also analysed by Schmidt (1998), Kie-
sewetter (1999), Lammersen (1999), Heinhold/ Hüsing/ Pasch (2000).
4taxation of interest payments, the benchmark value equals the tax rate on inter-
est income. For a cash flow-based tax, the EMTR which indicates neutrality is
zero; marginal investments are not taxed. As only marginal investments are
analysed, we cannot prove whether condition (1) is also satisfied by relying on
EMTR. However, a statement on whether an investment is tax-favoured or -
deprived can be made if investment projects exhibit different tax wedges. This
indicates that the invariance with respect to the pre-tax and post-tax ranking
might not always be given. Equal EMTR can thus be deemed to be a necessary
condition for investment neutrality to hold in all theoretically conceivable cases.
2.1.1.3 Effective Average Tax Burdens
Recently, the measurement of the effective tax burdens of inframarginal invest-
ments by effective average tax rates (EATR) has gained prominence. EATR are
deemed to be especially relevant for the location decisions of profitable, multi-
national firms.9 Analogously to (3) we can define an EATR t by
t = p
sp 
, (4)
with p and s denoting the pre-tax and the post-tax rate of return of an invest-
ment, respectively. The EMTR is a special case of equation (4).
With respect to investment neutrality, based on the EATR only a loose connec-
tion can be established to condition (1). This condition would be violated if two
investment projects had to earn different pre-tax rates of return to generate the
same post-tax rate of return. EATR usually are calculated based on a given pre-
tax rate of return p. With NPVA = NPVB, condition (1) then cannot be analysed.
Nevertheless, different EATR might provide strong arguments for the potential
effect of taxation on the ranking of inframarginal investments.
2.1.2 Assumptions and Structure of the Model
Based on a simple model, we now employ these two instruments to analyse the
potential impact of an ACE-based tax system on investment decisions.
                                                                                             
9 See Devereux/ Griffith (1998), pp. 353, 362; Richter/ Seitz/ Wiegard (1996), p. 19. For a recent ex-
tensive study which estimates EMTR as well as EATR in the European Union, see European Com-
mission (2001).
5We assume perfect capital markets with a unique given market interest rate,
price stability, time-invariant interest and tax rates, and an immediate loss com-
pensation. We ignore a number of issues, in particular wealth taxation, indirect
taxation, and uncertainty and thus risk premiums. Also, we do not consider any
dynamic effects, e.g. transition effects. We analyse an equity-financed one-
period investment, i.e. the investment is undertaken at the beginning of the pe-
riod, while the whole return on the capital employed occurs at the end.
Under a cash flow-tax or a pure ACE-tax, there is no second layer of capital in-
come taxation at the personal level. We therefore ignore personal taxes. This is
equivalent to a point of view of a corporation's management that ignores share-
holder taxation in their corporate decision-making.10 In this case, the benchmark
for an investment is the market interest rate r. The tax wedge is computed as
w~  = p~  – r. (5)
At first, we assume a decreasing marginal product of capital, economic rents
that are completely tied to a particular location, and arbitrarily divisible invest-
ments. We explain the effects of relaxing these assumptions in section 2.3.
2.2 Comparison of Effective Tax Burdens
König has derived a formula which is well-suited to show the effects of invest-
ment-neutral tax systems on rates of return.11 König supposes an (arbitrarily
chosen) tax system that reduces pre-tax net present values by the constant factor
(1 – c), with 0  c  1. This would imply c =  with  denoting the statutory tax
rate for a cash flow tax, and c = 0 for a tax on true economic income. Further-
more, König assumes that the funds available for investment are not reduced by
taxation.
Then, for an operation period of the investment L and a post-tax discount rate t
König obtains a general expression for the post-tax rate of return s:
11)1(1
)1(
)1()1( 




	




 L L
L
t c
ps

 . (6)
                                                                                             
10 A good reason for ignoring personal taxes is delivered by the fact that management might not know
the tax position of the marginal shareholder, which is quite conceivable to be the case for large corpo-
rations which have access to international capital markets. See also OECD (1991), p. 91.
11 See König (1997), pp. 54-57.
6For a cash-flow tax, the post-tax discount rate t is equal to the pre-tax discount
rate  and thus the market interest rate r. For L = 1, we obtain:
    rrps  1 . (7)
A marginal investment, which yields only the market interest rate r, is not taxed,
and the part of the return p which exceeds the market interest rate is taxed pro-
portionately. By applying the corresponding values, we now will illustrate this
connection between pre-tax and post-tax rates of return under a cash flow tax or
an ACE-tax.
2.2.1 Cash Flow Taxation and Optimal ACE-Based Taxation
For a cash flow tax and an optimally configured ACE-based tax where the pro-
tective interest rate z is equal to the unique market interest rate r, the rate of re-
turn of a marginal investment is not reduced. Only the economic rent, i.e. the
part of the return that exceeds the market interest rate,12 is taxed,13 as fig. 1 il-
lustrates. We assume r = z = 5 per cent, L = 1,  = 40 per cent. The abscissa con-
tains a proxy for the level of investment which is delivered by the marginal rate
of return on the capital employed. The ordinate in addition to the pre-tax rate of
return contains the associated post-tax rates of return and the discount rate.
The effects of such an ACE-tax on profitability exactly match those under a
cash flow tax. Due to the taxation of the generated return, the pre-tax rate of
return p is cut by the factor (1 –). This is illustrated by the rotation of p around
the zero-point. We obtain p  (1 – ).
The allowance for corporate equity is equivalent to an increase in the rate of
return by z  , while the immediate deduction under the cash flow tax increases
the rate of return by r  . With z = r, the deduction of the allowance for corpo-
rate equity with a simultaneous capitalisation of the investment for purposes of
tax law is equivalent to the immediate deduction of the initial cost under a cash
                                                                                             
12 We assume that both the risk premium – as we suppose certainty – and the imputed wage income of
the entrepreneurs are zero. Otherwise, the statement above would have to be modified, as the risk
premium and the imputed wage are economically not a part of the economic rent but are taxed by a
cash flow tax. See – also with respect to the definitions – Homburg (2000), pp. 132-133.
13 By relaxing the assumption that the invested amount is not affected by taxation, from the point of
view of an investor the pre-tax rate of return would equal the post-tax rate of return under a cash flow
tax. See König (1997), p. 57.
7flow tax.14 Both tax systems induce an increase in the rate of return from p  (1 –
) to p  (1 – ) + r  , which is equivalent to equation (7).
Regardless of the level of profitability, the capital employed always qualifies for
the allowance or the immediate deduction. This is reflected in an upward shift
of p  (1 – ) by the amount of r  . The resulting line indicates the post-tax rate
of return for an optimally configured cash flow- or ACE-tax sopt.
The economic rent is reduced proportionately, as indicated by sopt, which splits
the extra-rate of return illustrated by the distance between p and r by the factor
. Extramarginal, i.e. non-profitable investments might be subsidised.15 How-
ever, for  < 100 per cent, these projects do not become profitable. The more
profitable an investment, the higher its EATR t. The effective tax burden on the
marginal investment is zero per cent.
                                                                                             
14 See the early considerations by Lücke (1955).
15 We rely on this term to describe a situation where the post-tax rate of return exceeds the pre-tax rate
of return of an investment. A different definition might consider an investment as subsidised even if
the post-tax rate of return was lower than the pre-tax rate of return, but greater than the post-tax rate
of return under systematic taxation.
0%
5%
10%
15%
14%
p r
s
 t
12% 10% 8% 5%
p
 = t = r
p
sopt
w~  = 0%
2% 0% -2% -4%
p  (1–)
Marginal Investment
r  
Fig. 1: Effects of an optimal ACE-tax on profitability.
82.2.2 Misconfigured ACE-Tax
2.2.2.1 Deviation of the Protective Interest Rate and Neutral Depreciation
Based on the considerations underlying fig. 1 we now analyse the effects of an
ACE-tax on profitability and on decision-making in case the protective interest
rate is above or below the optimum level. At first, we suppose that the invest-
ment neither depreciates economically nor for tax purposes. The cash flow is
equivalent to the one generated by a financial asset which yields a given rate of
return.
With respect to an additional investment of an existing, profitable firm, a sub-
optimally low protective interest rate is equivalent to a partial exemption of the
allowance for corporate equity, where the imputed interest is taxed at a low but
still positive statutory tax rate. This is very relevant as most real-world tax sys-
tems that rely on an allowance for corporate equity only permit such a partial
exemption.16
We assume z = 2.5 per cent and retain the other assumptions from above. Now,
the value of the allowance for corporate equity z   is lower than before. This is
illustrated by a smaller parallel shift of the p  (1 – )-line (fig. 2). Compared
with a cash flow-tax or an optimal ACE-tax, the pre-tax rate of return is addi-
tionally cut by the amount (r – z)  . The extraordinary part of the rate of return
is therefore no longer taxed proportionately. High extra-rates of return are taxed
at a lower effective tax rate than low extra-rates of return.17 However, according
to (4) investments which are more profitable still bear a greater effective tax
burden t than those which are less profitable.
With respect to the marginal investment, now there is a positive tax wedge. The
post-tax rate of return of an investment s has to equal at least the market interest
rate r in order to be profitable from the point of view of an investor. In the ex-
ample, this condition is satisfied for a pre-tax rate of return of 6.67 per cent.
Thus we obtain a tax wedge w~ Z of 1.67 per cent.18 This is equivalent to an
EMTR of 25 per cent.
                                                                                             
16 In detail, see the references mentioned in footnote 7.
17 This is illustrated by fig. 2: The relation between the distance p – s (tax burden) and the distance
p – r (extra rate of return) decreases with an increasing pre-tax rate of return of the investment p.
18 See Lammersen (1999), pp. 76-99, for a more technical model which permits the derivation of ef-
fective marginal tax burdens in more general cases and which is based on the approach by King/
Fullerton (1984).
9In case we regard the p-line as the marginal product of capital, the triangle de-
fined by the p-line, the r-line and the tax wedge illustrates the excess burden of
taxation. The excess burden increases more than proportionately with an in-
creasing statutory tax rate. The same holds true for an increasing difference
between the market interest rate and the protective interest rate.
For a suboptimally high protective interest rate, the great value of the allowance
for corporate equity z   shifts the p  (1 – )-line above the intersection point of
the p-line and the r-line, which determines the marginal investment in case of a
neutral tax system (fig. 3). Compared with the optimal case, the rate of return of
all the investments is increased by (z – r)  . Even some of those investments
that would be inframarginal without taxation are subsidised; their pre-tax rate of
return s exceeds their post-tax rate of return p.
Meanwhile the discount rate increases. The investor could buy financial assets
inside the corporation which yield the market interest rate. The return on these
0%
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10%
15%
14%
p r
s
 t
12% 10% 6.67% 5%
p
 = t = r
p
s
w~  = 1.67%
2% 0% -2% -4%
p  (1–)
sopt
Impact of Taxation on the Marginal Investment
Fig. 2: Rates of return and tax wedge under an ACE-tax and a suboptimally low
protective interest rate.
10
assets would be taxed at the statutory tax rate; also, the amount invested would
qualify for the allowance for corporate equity. Thus, the financial asset would
yield a post tax rate of return which marks the opportunity costs of any real in-
vestment of
t
* = r  (1 – ) + z   (8)
Although the protective interest rate deviates from the market interest rate, there
is no wedge between the cost of capital p~  and the market interest rate r. Com-
pared with the market interest rate, the post-tax rate of return of the financial
asset increases by the amount of (z – r)  . Thus, compared with the pre-tax
level of investment, no additional real investment is undertaken. Any additional
real investment would earn less than the subsidised financial asset. However, in
the long-run there might be changes in the level of the market interest rate and
therefore some consequential effects on real investment.
In case the increased protective interest rate applied only to real investment, the
discount rate would not increase. Then the market interest rate r would be the
benchmark for the post-tax rate of return of any real investment. Due to the sub-
0%
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10%
15%
14%
p r
s
 t
12% 10% 8% 5%
p
 = t = r
p
s
rp ~
2% 0% -2% -4%
p  (1–)
sopt
t
*
 = r  (1–) + z  7%
w~ = –3.33%
s
Fig. 3: Rates of return and tax wedge under an ACE-tax and a suboptimally
high protective interest rate.
11
sidy by the increased protective interest rate z, there would be a negative tax
wedge w~  and a positive excess burden due to overinvestment, as illustrated by
fig. 3.
To conclude, there might be asymmetric effects of high and low protective in-
terest rates on investment behaviour. A suboptimally high protective interest
rate can be offset by the increased rate of return of a firm's financial assets, at
least with respect to the primary effects. In contrast, a suboptimally low protec-
tive interest rate distorts investment decisions because the financial assets,
which are purchased outside the company in this case, are not equally disad-
vantaged.19
2.2.2.2 Deviation of the Protective Interest Rate and Non-Neutral Depreciation
In case of an investment which depreciates economically, we have to consider
effects that stem from the tax deductions due to depreciation allowances in ad-
dition to the effects that stem from the statutory tax rate and the allowance for
corporate equity. Again, we will consider a one-period investment. In this way,
the change in the rate of return due to the depreciation allowances can be ana-
lysed in isolation.
If we assume the investment to have an initial cost of one, an advantage from an
accelerated (decelerated) tax depreciation at a value of deductions of a com-
pared with true economic depreciation at a value of  induces a tax advantage
(disadvantage) of (a – )  . According to our assumptions, this advantage is
reversed right after one period. Therefore, the final effect is only due to an in-
terest-free tax deferment (tax prepayment). Consequently, the effective advan-
tage (disadvantage) amounts to t  (a – )  Additionally, the allowance for
corporate equity decreases (increases) by (a – )  z. The value of this effect is
  (a – )  z. The whole effect thus amounts to:
s =   (a – (t – z). (9)
In case the discount rate t equals the market interest rate r, there is a positive
effect on rates of return in case there is an accelerated (decelerated) tax depre-
                                                                                             
19 The financial assets might, however, be equally disadvantaged if the institutions issuing these assets
are also disadvantaged by a low protective interest rate. We do not analyse this case since we assume
that a lender might always obtain the unique market interest rate for his funds.
12
ciation schedule and the protective interest rate is lower (higher) than the mar-
ket interest rate.
There is a negative effect if an accelerated (decelerated) depreciation schedule
is combined with a protective interest rate which is higher (lower) than the mar-
ket interest rate. Under a suboptimally high protective interest rate, i.e. a pro-
tective interest rate that exceeds the unique market interest rate, an accelerated
depreciation schedule thus decreases the post-tax rate of return since the value
of the interest-free tax deferment from increased depreciation allowances is
lower than the one from the lost part of the allowance for corporate equity.
Depreciation allowances do not have an effect on rates of return if there is a
neutral depreciation schedule or if the protective interest rate equals the market
interest rate and thus the discount rate.
Expression (9) is independent of the pre-tax rate of return of the investment p.
This indicates that under these assumptions, an advantage or disadvantage given
by the tax base is equivalent to an advantage or disadvantage given by an in-
creased or decreased allowance for corporate equity. Such an effect would be
illustrated by a parallel shift. Both effects are based on the initial cost of the in-
vestment, not on the rate of return. Thus, their relative importance decreases
compared with the relevance of the statutory tax rate with an increasing rate of
return of an investment.
2.3 Summary of the Effects on Profitability and Conclusions
2.3.1 Effects Under Theoretical Tax Systems
To sum up, the effects illustrated in fig. 1 to 3 can be transformed into the ef-
fective tax rates calculated by expression (4) and shown in fig. 4.
The choice of the protective interest rate is very important for investments that
earn a low rate of return. Up to a rate of return equal to the protective interest
rate, investment is subsidised (s > p; EATR < 0). For a more and more increas-
ing rate of return, the EATR tends towards the statutory tax rate . This occurs
because the allowance for corporate equity is independent of the rate of return
of the investment. Thus, for given tax parameters, the allowance for corporate
equity works like a lump-sum subsidy on the capital employed. The greater the
13
pre-tax rate of return, the relatively less important this lump-sum amount. In
principle, the same would be true for a tax advantage given by generous depre-
ciation allowances.
To conclude: Under an ACE-based tax system, highly profitable investments
face a higher EATR than less profitable investments. The choice of the protec-
tive interest rate is (1) important for the determination of the point that separates
subsidised from taxed investments. Thereupon, it (2) determines the value of the
quasi-lump-sum amount paid by the government on the employed capital. The
relative importance of this lump-sum amount decreases with an increasing rate
of return, while the relative importance of the statutory tax rate increases.
Therefore, an ACE-based tax might exhibit a disadvantage in international tax
competition. This becomes clear when we relax the assumption that any eco-
nomic rent is completely location-specific and that any investment is arbitrarily
divisible.
In fact, investment projects of multinational firms are shaped by discrete deci-
sion structures, i.e., the projects are not arbitrarily divisible and are mutually
exclusive, and by the existence of relatively high rates of return.20 To a large
                                                                                             
20 See Devereux/ Hubbard (2000), p. 3.
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Fig. 4: Effective Average Tax Burdens under an ACE-tax.
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extent, these economic rents are firm-specific and thus independent of a par-
ticular location.
If an investor has to decide between an investment in a country that offers a fa-
vourable tax base but a high statutory tax rate and a country that offers a less
favourable definition of the tax base but a low statutory tax rate, a great ex-
pected rate of return in principle is a strong argument for choosing the country
that offers the lower statutory tax rate.21 We show this effect by a real world tax
burden comparison now.
2.3.2 Effects Under Existing Tax Systems
We rely on the detailed approach by Devereux and Griffith22 for the calculation
of the cost of capital, EMTR, and EATR. This approach permits modelling a
number of further issues of taxation, e.g. different sources of finance, different
assets with complex tax depreciation rules, or inflation. We concentrate on
taxation at the corporate level. In analogy to the considerations above, under our
assumptions the effective tax rates t calculated by the Devereux/ Griffith-
approach are a weighted average of the EMTR t~ imposed on the rate of return
as far as it covers the cost of capital, and the statutory corporate tax rate  im-
posed on the part of the rate of return which exceeds the cost of capital:23



p
ppt
p
pt
~~~
. (10)
If two tax systems exhibit different costs of capital and different statutory tax
rates, it might depend on the pre-tax rate of return which one of the two tax
systems offers the lower effective tax burden.
For example, we show this by relying on the tax systems of Sweden and Italy in
early 2001. In addition to depreciation allowances, Italy granted a low tax rate
of 23.25 per cent on the part of the profits that did not exceed an imputed inter-
est rate based on equity invested. Effectively, this imputed interest rate ex-
                                                                                             
21 See also Bond (2000), p. 173.
22 See Devereux/ Griffith (1999). For technical descriptions of the approach, see also European Com-
mission (2001), Annex A, and Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002).
23 See Spengel/ Lammersen (2001), pp. 227-228; Devereux/ Griffith (2002), p. 11; Schreiber/ Spengel/
Lammersen (2002), pp. 13-14.
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ceeded the market interest rate.24 Profits above this imputed interest were taxed
at a comparatively high statutory tax rate of 40.25%. In Sweden, the rules for
the determination of the taxable base were more restrictive, whereas the statu-
tory tax rate at effectively 26 per cent25 was significantly lower than the one in
Italy.
Starting off from the marginal investment, fig. 5 plots the effective tax rates for
an additional investment26 computed by the Devereux/ Griffith approach.
The cost of capital of an Italian investment is lower than the one of a Swedish
investment. This is illustrated by the fact that the solid line representing the
Italian investment begins further to the left than the dashed line representing the
Swedish investment. Consequently, the EMTR is significantly lower in Italy
than in Sweden. It is even negative, indicating that the investment has to earn
less than the market interest rate.
                                                                                             
24 See in detail Bordignon/ Giannini/ Panteghini (2000).
25 The statutory tax rate was 28 per cent; by allocating a part of the profits into a tax exempt reserve
for up to five years, the effective statutory rate can be reduced to 26 per cent. See International Bu-
reau of Fiscal Documentation (2001), p. 554. Furthermore, we assume that the Swedish corporation is
a large listed corporation which does not qualify for the profit split rules of the Swedish dual income
tax.
26 The assumed investment consists of a bundle of five different types of assets (industrial buildings,
patents, machinery, financial assets, inventories), which is financed by a mix of retained earnings,
new equity, and debt. The parameters for the calculations are taken from European Commission
(2001), pp. 201 and Annex B.
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For an increasing rate of return, the weight of more generous depreciation al-
lowances and of the rules for the corporate equity allowance diminishes ac-
cording to expression (10). Every Euro earned in addition to the cost of capital
is taxed at the (effective) statutory tax rate, i.e. 40.25 per cent in Italy and 26 per
cent in Sweden. Italy's advantage soon disappears. Under these assumptions,
already for low two-digit pre-tax rates of return Sweden regularly is the location
where the investor can expect to be left with the greater post-tax economic rent.
For highly profitable investments, the EATR approaches the respective statu-
tory tax rate.
According to the theory of the cost of capital and the EMTR, more investments
should be realised in Italy than in Sweden. If, however, an investor faces a
choice between realising a very profitable investment either in Italy or in Swe-
den, she will regularly prefer Sweden.
This might indicate that a country has to take account of its headline tax rate,
regardless of any elements of an ACE-tax. This headline tax rate on corporate
profits should not exceed the one prevailing in competing countries by too
much.
With effect from January 2001, Croatia has given up its ACE-based tax system
and simultaneously has reduced the statutory corporate income tax rate from 35
per cent to 20 per cent.27 Regardless of the actual motives of the Croatian gov-
ernment for acting this way, the considerations above might provide a theoreti-
cally consistent argument for such a policy. Also, Italy has abandoned its ACE-
elements in the meantime.28 There are statements by the Italian government that
the effective statutory corporate profit tax rate should be reduced from 40.25 per
cent in 2001 to 33 per cent.29
3. Revenue Effects of ACE-Based Taxation
3.1 Starting Point and Assumptions
Based on the simple model developed above, we will now analyse potential
revenue effects of an ACE-based tax system. The investigation is limited to
                                                                                             
27 See Knoll (2001), pp. 240-241.
28 See already the remarks in footnote 7.
29 See KPMG (2002).
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capital income taxation at the corporate level. Under a pure ACE-tax, there
would be no additional tax layer for personal income from capital anyway.
However, we do not regard those tax revenues that would result from the taxa-
tion of labour income.
In case the ACE-tax is optimally configured, positive tax revenues are only
collected from capital that earns an economic rent. To analyse the revenue ef-
fects for different levels of the protective interest rate and the statutory tax rate,
we will rely on the considerations taken above. Thus the assumptions regarding
the economic conditions mentioned in section 2 and used as a basis for fig. 1
remain valid.
3.2 Estimation of Revenue Effects
To derive an expression for computing the tax payments of a model firm which
faces the production function and the economic conditions illustrated by fig. 1
to 3, we assume that only real investment qualifies for an increased protective
interest rate. The protective interest rate for corporate financial assets is thus
limited to the market interest rate.30
As we suppose that the funds available for investment are not affected by taxa-
tion, the tax-induced reduction in the rate of return is equivalent to the tax paid.
With respect to highly profitable investments, there is a positive tax payment by
the corporation. If we assume the model firm to be representative for the whole
economy, these investment projects generate positive tax revenues. In fig. 3, this
can be illustrated by the area between p, s, and the ordinate.
Meanwhile, the government might subsidise a number of realised investments
due to an excessive protective interest rate. The rate of return of these invest-
ments is increased by taxation. From the point of view of the economy as a
whole, these investments reduce tax revenue. In fig. 3, this is illustrated by the
triangle between p, s, and the tax wedge.
On balance, these two effects constitute the whole revenue effect. The tax reve-
nue T can be quantified by measuring the area between the pre-tax rate of return
p, the post-tax rate of return s, the highest yielding investment project at p = 15
                                                                                             
30 Without this assumption there might be a potential for arbitrage, which might lead to changes in the
interest rates. Thus no statements about revenue effects would be possible without a quantification of
the effects of these changes.
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per cent, and the marginal investment, which exhibits a pre-tax rate of return of
p~ . The firm does not undertake any investments beyond the marginal invest-
ment, thus there are no further revenue effects.
Algebraically, this area is quantified by:
 dpzppdpspT
pp  
%15
~
%15
~ )1(  . (11)
Thus the tax revenue is:
)~
2
~()15,0
2
0225,0( 2   zppzT . (12)
To calculate particular values, we have to determine the pre-tax rate of return of
the marginal investment p~  by equating the post-tax rate of return s with the
market interest rate r. Thus:
rzp   )1(~   )1(
~





zrp . (13)
The tax revenue is zero in case the cost of capital exceeds the pre-tax rate of
return of the highest-yielding investment, i.e. 15 per cent. Thus:
T = )~2
~()15.0
2
0225.0( 2   zppz  for )1( 


 zr
< 15% (14)
= 0 else.
From these expressions, tax revenue can be estimated for all relevant parameter
constellations.
3.3 Analysis and Conclusions
Fig. 6 illustrates the revenue effects of this model case.31
                                                                                             
31 The expressions are based only on the economic environment illustrated by fig. 2. Thus they cannot
be applied universally. This does, however, not mean that the principle results cannot be generalised.
These results appear plausible also for other economic environments, i.e. production functions which
exhibit a different shape or depreciating investments.
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At first, we vary the level of the statutory corporate tax rate for a given protec-
tive interest rate. This is equivalent to a longitudinal section of fig. 6. We can
distinguish between three different areas:
(1) In case the protective interest rate is lower than the market interest rate, we
obtain a revenue effect which is similar to the well-known "Laffer Curve":32
For low tax rates, an increase in the tax rate leads to an increase in tax reve-
nues. The greater the tax rates, however, the greater will be the tax wedge, as
the protective interest rate is too low. The cost of capital increases at the ex-
pense of less investment activity and less tax revenue. With an increasing
statutory tax rate, this effect becomes more and more dominant. At some
point, the cost of capital exceeds the pre-tax rate of return of the highest
yielding investment, investment drops to zero, and the tax revenue is zero.
                                                                                             
32 For the Laffer-curve see for example Grüske (1991).
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(2) In case the protective interest rate equals the market interest rate, the revenue
effect of an increase in the statutory tax rate is always linearly positive. In-
vestment decisions are not affected by taxation. The economic rent is taxed
proportionately. For a tax rate very close to 100 per cent, the economic rent
is practically completely seized.
(3) In case the protective interest rate exceeds the market interest rate, there are
strong negative effects on tax revenue: First, there are revenue losses and
even subsidies of investments that were inframarginal before taxes are con-
sidered. Second, due to negative tax wedges, investors increase investment
activity and undertake investments that were extramarginal before taxes are
considered. In case the protective interest rate is (a) only slightly above the
market interest rate, the negative effects on tax revenue dominate positive ef-
fects only for high statutory tax rates. This is due to the fact that a higher
statutory tax rate admittedly enlarges an existing tax wedge disproportion-
ately.33 However, if the tax wedge is relatively small, also the effect of an in-
creased tax rate is small. Under a (b) highly excessive protective interest rate
negative effects soon dominate positive effects. Especially the negative ef-
fect induced by increased investment activity is very costly for the govern-
ment.
So far, we assumed an immediate loss compensation. Unless an immediate loss
compensation is provided, it has to be noted that negative net revenues cannot
be expected. The negative revenues illustrated in fig. 6 mirror the following
facts: Firms can build huge tax loss carryforwards and thus might avoid (poten-
tial) future tax payments, which reduces (potential) future tax revenue. This
strategy is only profitable for corporations if they expect profits which permit
the use of the tax loss carryforward. In the long run, under the assumption of
time-invariant potential rates of return and a time invariant-tax system, this is
not possible. Thus the tax loss carryforward would be worthless for them; the
revenue under these combinations of tax rates and the protective interest rate
would in fact be zero.
A variation in the protective interest rate, which would be equivalent to a cross-
section of fig. 6, would have the following effects:
                                                                                             
33 In more detail, see Lammersen (1999), p. 104.
21
(4) For low statutory tax rates, an increase in the protective interest rate leads to
a moderate reduction of tax revenues. The tax wedge and thus the effects of
taxation on investment decisions do not play an important role here.
(5) For medium-sized statutory tax rates, the revenue maximum shifts into the
direction of the optimal protective interest rate as effects of taxation on deci-
sion-making become more and more dominant.
(6) For high statutory tax rates, the effects on decision-making are very strong.
The tax authorities can only collect tax revenues worth mentioning if the
protective interest rate is (almost) optimally configured. Then there are al-
most no distortions to the investment decision, and the tax raises the maxi-
mum revenue. However, fig. 6 impressively illustrates what a balancing act it
is to determine the protective interest rate in this area. Already small devia-
tions from the market interest rate would induce huge revenue losses.
Thus, from a legal point of view, an ACE-based tax in principle exhibits a
smaller tax base than e.g. a traditional comprehensive income tax. If there exist
economic rents, however, the part of the tax which taxes capital income might
collect tax revenues which (theoretically) might seize the whole economic rent.
These revenues would surely not be negligible. According to these results, tax
revenues which are relatively high and simultaneously not very much affected
by a variation of parameters, i.e. which do not require a special „fine tuning“,
can be obtained by relying on medium-sized tax rates combined with a rather
low protective interest rate.34
If we relax the assumptions and permit that international location decisions are
shaped by a discrete character and non-location specific economic rents, the
considerations mentioned above need a modification. As such location deci-
sions are probably influenced strongly by statutory tax rates, greater tax reve-
nues can be expected for low levels of statutory tax rates. Then, a country might
manage to attract a number of profitable investment projects, which would oth-
erwise be realised in different tax territories. Depending on the tax level pre-
vailing in competing locations, for an increasing domestic statutory tax rate,
ceteris paribus, more and more relatively profitable investments are withdrawn.
                                                                                             
34 In the example illustrated by fig. 6, a statutory tax rate between 40 and 60 per cent combined with a
protective interest rate between 1 and 4 per cent generates tax revenues between about 50 and 70 per
cent of the economic rent.
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Thus tax revenue for high statutory tax rates can be expected to be lower than
indicated by fig. 6.
Therefore, also from the perspective of tax revenues, the claim that statutory
corporate tax rates should not exceed those of other countries by much is sup-
ported.
4. Summary
(1) An optimally configured ACE-based tax theoretically satisfies the claim to
be neutral with respect to investment decisions.
(2) In case the protective interest rate deviates from the market interest rate, in
the model investment neutrality is lost. In order to analyse the effects on in-
vestment decisions, the interplay of the protective interest rate and the defi-
nition of the tax base have to be considered. For example, an accelerated de-
preciation allowance might increase the cost of capital in case of an exces-
sive protective interest rate.
(3) The allowance for corporate equity is a tax deduction that is effectively
based on the initial cost of an investment. As such, the relative importance of
this deduction decreases with an increasing rate of return, whereas the rela-
tive importance of the statutory tax rate increases.
(4) Theoretically, an ACE-based tax is suited to generate tax revenues which are
not negligible from an economic point of view. To estimate these effects,
one has to take the effects from the choice of the protective interest rate and
the statutory tax rate on investment decisions into account. Robust tax reve-
nues appear to be generated by a combination of a low protective interest
rate and medium-sized statutory tax rates.
(5) Supposed that investment decisions of multinational firms are shaped by
firm-specific economic rents and mutually exclusive, discrete alternatives, an
ACE-based tax might induce disadvantages in international tax competition
insofar as the tax imposes a heavier burden on profitable than on less profit-
able investments. The statutory tax rate of an ACE-based tax should there-
fore not exceed the one prevailing in competing locations by much.
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